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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae listed in the Appendix are professors
of history, political science, and law with particular
expertise in the history of citizenship, gender, and
family law. Amici have a professional interest in
ensuring that the Court has adequate historical
perspective on the law of citizenship and the extent
to which it has been shaped by outdated gender-
based stereotypes and norms.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sex-based laws premised on archaic
presumptions about the proper roles of men and
women run afoul of established constitutional
principles, especially when they interfere with the
parent-child relationship. Amici write to explain the
history of the federal government’s use of sex-based
classifications in the regulation of citizenship. In its
regulation of intergenerational and interspousal
citizenship transmission, the federal government has
perpetuated outdated gender-based norms
concerning proper parental roles, even when those
norms have been rejected in other legal and social
contexts. In addition, the laws governing derivative
citizenship have significantly encumbered the ability
of American fathers to transmit citizenship to their
foreign-born nonmarital children.
1. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
Counsel of record for both parties received notice at least 10
days prior to the due date of amici’s intention to file this brief.
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no counsel for a party (nor a party itself) made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief. No person other than amici or their counsel made a
monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
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In its brief, the government contends that the
purpose behind the explicitly sex-based citizenship
statute at issue in this case is “gender neutral.” The
historical sources tell a very different story. As this
Court has observed, “our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination.” Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1977). The law
governing derivative citizenship is part of that
history.
Traditionally, the notion that the husband was
the legal and political head of the marital family was
one of the most powerful beliefs to shape the United
States’ regulation of derivative citizenship. The
male-headship principle has informed every aspect of
the derivative citizenship statute. For married
citizen parents, well into the twentieth century the
headship principle led to dramatic differences
between the rights of citizen fathers and citizen
mothers to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born
children. Married citizen fathers could transmit
citizenship to their foreign-born children starting in
1790; it was another 150 years before Congress
recognized the right of married citizen mothers to do
the same.
Outside of marriage, the reverse pattern
prevailed. Social norms dictated that the mother
bore responsibility for nonmarital children, while the
father played little role in their care and upbringing.
Based on these gender-based views about parental
roles, the federal government substantially limited
citizenship transmission between citizen fathers and
their foreign-born nonmarital children in ways
unrelated to the need to ascertain the existence of a
biological or meaningful father-child relationship. At
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the same time, the federal government readily
recognized the citizenship claims of foreign-born
nonmarital children of citizen mothers.
These gender-based patterns continue in the
federal government’s regulation of derivative
citizenship today, separating fathers from their
children in a manner that is contrary to this Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence.
ARGUMENT
This Court has recognized time and again that
laws that distinguish between men and women based
on outdated understandings of their “talents,
capacities, or preferences” are contrary to
constitutional gender-equality principles. United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see also
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero 411
U.S. at 684 (1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
One undeniable theme of these decisions is that such
sex-based distinctions are suspect whenever they
presume separate societal roles for the sexes, both
vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis their children. See
Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
731 (2003) (upholding a federal family leave law
designed to redress the “pervasive sex-role
stereotype that caring for family members is
women’s work”); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (recognizing that gender-based
roles are no longer fundamental to marriage).
Another important theme in this Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence is that undue legal
restrictions on the recognition of the father-child
relationship outside marriage are constitutionally
infirm and socially harmful, especially where those
restrictions contribute to the stigma of “illegitimacy.”
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See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(recognizing the interest of an unwed father “in the
children he has sired and raised”); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) (“[I]mposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility.”).
A reconstruction of the history of American
citizenship law reveals that the sex-based parental
presence requirements in the derivative citizenship
statute that governs Respondent’s citizenship
contravene these well-established constitutional
principles.
I. FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP LAW
HISTORICALLY PRIVILEGED THE RIGHTS OF
MARRIED CITIZEN FATHERS AND SEVERELY
LIMITED THE RIGHTS OF MARRIED CITIZEN
MOTHERS.
A. The Derivative Citizenship Laws Were
Premised on the Belief That the Husband-
Father Determined the Political and Cultural
Character of His Wife and Children.
Historically, the husband’s position as “head of
the family” in domestic law gave him enormous
power over both his wife and children.2 In the early
nineteenth century, the father had far greater legal
rights with respect to the marital children than the
mother. See Michael Grossberg, Governing the
2. See generally Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130,
141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“[I]t became a maxim of
* * * [the common law] that a woman had no legal existence
separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and
representative in the social state.”).
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Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century
America 235, 242 (1985). He was considered the
children’s “legal guardian[].” Id. at 242. Moreover,
the “headship” principle enhanced married men’s
cultural, political, and legal authority far beyond the
household itself. Citizenship law was no exception.
See Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s
Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 103 Am.
Hist. Rev. 1440, 1452 (Dec. 1998); Virginia Sapiro,
Women, Citizenship, and Nationality: Immigration
and Naturalization Policies in the United States, 13
Pol. & Soc’y 1, 11 (1984).
Operating under the presumption that the
husband-father shaped the political and cultural
character of his dependents, federal law privileged
the father as the source of citizenship for foreign-
born marital children from 1790, when the first
citizenship statute was enacted, until 1934. Act of
Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604
[hereinafter “Act of 1855”]; Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch.
28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20,
§ 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1,
1 Stat. 103, 103-104. See generally Linda K. Kerber,
No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and
the Obligations of Citizenship 33-38 (1998).
The male headship principle was so powerful that
even ambiguous statutory language in the
citizenship statutes of 1790, 1795, and 1802—which
referred to the citizenship of children of “citizens”—
was generally understood to require that the father
was an American citizen. See 2 James Kent,
Commentaries on American Law 53 (8th ed. 1854).
In 1855, Congress affirmed that interpretation,
rewording the statute to clarify that only children
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“whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their
birth citizens of the United States, shall be
deemed * * * citizens of the United States.” Act of
1855, § 1 (emphasis added). In keeping with the
established norm of male headship, Congress also
declared that a non-citizen woman would become an
American citizen simply by marrying an American
man. Id. § 2. See Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals:
Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History
234-35 (1997).
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the social and legal foundations of the
male headship principle began to erode. State
legislatures and courts gradually revised domestic
laws giving husbands power over their wives’ legal
and economic personae.3 By the late nineteenth
century, judges and legislators began to abandon the
common law principle that the husband-father was
the “legal guardian” of his children, with parental
rights superior to those of the married mother. See
Grossberg, supra, at 253. Nevertheless, Congress
continued to presume that the husband determined
the political and cultural character of his
dependents—both wife and children—and hence that
their citizenship should conform to his.
For example, in 1922 Congress enacted the Cable
Act which, among other things, limited an American
man’s absolute power to endow his foreign wife with
citizenship simply by marrying her. Act of Sept. 22,
3. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s
Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880,
103 Yale L.J. 1073, 1083 (1994); T.A. Larson, Woman Suffrage
in Western America, 38 Utah Hist. Q. 7, 19 (1970); see also U.S.
Const. amend. XIX.
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1922 (Cable Act), ch. 411, § 2, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022.
But the Cable Act and other federal statutes
continued to give preference to American men’s
foreign wives by expediting their naturalization
process, id. §§ 2(a), (b), exempting them from race-
based and national-origin immigration restrictions,
and otherwise giving them preferential immigration
status. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, §§ 4(a), (d),
13(c), 43 Stat. 153, 155, 162. An American woman
who married a foreign husband received no such
preferential treatment. To the contrary, for many
decades she was expatriated upon marriage to a
foreigner and was denied the ability to transmit
citizenship to her foreign-born children. See infra at
10-13; Candice Lewis Bredbenner, A Nationality of
Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of
Citizenship 84 (1998).
In short, well into the twentieth century, laws
governing citizenship transmission reflected and
perpetuated prevailing social and legal norms that
secured men’s place as head of the marital family.
B. The Gender-Based Belief That the Wife Had
No Independent Political Identity Shaped the
Interpretation and Development of the
Derivative Citizenship Statute.
The same norms that informed married fathers’
power to transmit citizenship to their non-citizen
wives and foreign-born children conversely led to
substantial limitations on the citizenship rights of
married American women. Under the doctrine of
coverture, married women had no independent civil
or legal identity—they were “dead” in the eyes of the
law. See Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law:
Women, Marriage, and Property in Nineteenth-
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Century New York 50-55 (1982). A wife’s legal and
political identity was “merged” into that of her
husband. That principle was pervasive, shaping the
political and legal rights of married women,
including their rights as mothers. Although strong
social and cultural norms made mothers the primary
caregivers of children, for most of the nineteenth
century the wife-mothers’ parental rights remained
secondary to those of the husband-father. See
Grossberg, supra, at 235-36.
Even as these powerful norms were successfully
challenged in other areas of law in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see supra
n.3, they continued to inform Congress’s regulation
of married women’s citizenship rights with respect to
both their own citizenship and that of their foreign-
born children. Three examples are especially
revealing.
First, the principle of coverture was integrated
into citizenship law through the expatriation of
American women who married foreign men. This
had not been the common law practice. See Shanks
v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830) (Story, J.);
Bredbenner, supra, at 59. Nevertheless, in the late
nineteenth century, some courts began expatriating
American women who married non-citizens. See,
e.g., Pequignot v. City of Detroit, 16 F. 211, 216
(C.C.E.D. Mich. 1883).
Consistent with its tendency to enhance the sex-
discriminatory function of citizenship law, Congress
codified the Pequignot holding in the Expatriation
Act of 1907, which provided that “any American
woman who marries a foreigner shall take the
nationality of her husband.” Act of Mar. 2, 1907
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(Expatriation Act), ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228.
Affirming the constitutionality of that Act eight
years later, this Court observed that “[t]he identity of
husband and wife is an ancient principle of our
jurisprudence [which] * * * worked in many
instances for her protection” and “give[s] dominance
to the husband.” Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299,
311 (1915).
After the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920, women’s opposition to the
Expatriation Act gained force. See Bredbenner,
supra, at 81; Cott, 103 Am. Hist. Rev. at 1464;
Sapiro, 13 Pol. & Soc’y at 13. Over fierce resistance
by legislators and advocates who insisted that the
principle of coverture should continue to dictate
married women’s citizenship status, in 1922
Congress ended the automatic expatriation of some,
but not all, American women who married non-
citizens. Cable Act, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. at 1022.
Most notably, under the Cable Act, the American
woman whose foreign husband was racially ineligible
to naturalize—at the time, individuals of Asian
descent—continued to be stripped of her citizenship.
Id. §§ 3, 5, 42 Stat. at 1022; 6 Fed. Stat. Ann. § 2169
(1918); see also Kerber, supra, at 42-43; Kerry
Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the
Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 Colum. L.
Rev. 641, 662, 694 n.335 (2005). No such racist
penalty burdened an American man who did the
same.
Second, even after the enactment of the Cable
Act, married American women were still unable to
transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children.
See Bredbenner, supra, at 84; Kristin A. Collins,
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Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and
the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation,
123 Yale L.J. 2134, 2156-57 (2014). By the late
nineteenth century, American women had gained far
greater legal rights as parents within marriage. See
Grossberg, supra, at 281-82. Nevertheless, the
federal government resisted recognizing the married
mother’s right to transmit citizenship due to the
persistent belief that the husband determined his
children’s political and cultural character.
This belief was apparent in debates over bills
proposed in the 1930s that would have recognized
married American mothers’ foreign-born children as
American citizens. As an Assistant Secretary of
State explained in a letter submitted to Congress in
1933, “when a woman having American nationality
marries a man having the nationality of a foreign
country, and establishes her home with him in his
country, the national character of that country is
likely to be stamped upon the children,” making the
children “alien in character.” Letter from Assistant
Sec’y of State Wilbur J. Carr to Samuel Dickstein,
Chairman of the House Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization (Feb. 10, 1933), reprinted in Relating
to the Naturalization and Citizenship Status of
Children Whose Mothers Are Citizens of the United
States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain
Inequalities in Matters of Nationality: Hearings on
H.R. 3673 and H.R. 77 Before the H. Comm. on
Immigration and Naturalization, 73d Cong. 9 (1st
Sess. 1933).
According to many officials, this concern was
especially acute where the American mother had
married a non-citizen who was racially excludable
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under the naturalization laws. Act of Feb. 5, 1917,
ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876; 6 Fed. Stat. Ann. § 2169
(1918). In 1931, Congress had repealed the race-
based exception in the Cable Act, so that a woman
who married a husband “ineligible to citizenship”
would no longer be expatriated. Act of Mar. 3, 1931,
ch. 442, § 4(a), 46 Stat. 1511, 1511-12. However,
there was great resistance to recognizing the
children born to such marriages as American
citizens. Not only might such a child be especially
“alien” in his or her “character,” but recognition of
married American mothers’ right to transmit
citizenship to their foreign-born children would
create a new path for entry into the United States for
children who were otherwise racially excludable. See
Collins, 123 Yale L.J. at 2191-95. As one
representative explained in 1933, by allowing
married women to transmit citizenship to their
foreign-born children, “we are increasing the
probability of bringing in more of the Chinese and
Japanese, and ‘what have you,’ from these nations
over there.” Hearings on H.R. 3673, at 73d Cong. at
37 (statement of Representative Charles Kramer).
Resistance to recognizing the right of married
American mothers to secure citizenship for their
foreign-born children was thus particularly intense
because of concern that other priorities in American
nationality law would be compromised.
Third, it was not until 1934 that Congress finally
recognized the right of married American mothers to
transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children.
Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, 797.
But, even then, beliefs about married women’s lack
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of authority within marriage continued to shape the
derivative citizenship law in significant ways.
The introduction of a child residence requirement
is a revealing example. When, after almost 150
years, married women finally secured the right to
transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children in
1934, Congress included a provision requiring the
foreign-born child of an American parent and a non-
citizen parent to reside in the United States for five
years prior to turning 18. Id. § 1, 48 Stat. at 797.
Although facially non-discriminatory, that
requirement was animated by the persistent belief
that the husband-father controlled the political
character of the children. A 1938 letter to Congress
from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Labor,
and the Attorney General explained that the five-
year child-residence requirement was included in the
1934 Act because “Congress apparently took into
consideration the fact that persons born in foreign
countries whose fathers were nationals of those
countries would be likely to have stronger ties with
the foreign country than with the United States.”
House Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization,
76th Cong., Rep. Proposing a Revision and
Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United
States, Part One: Proposed Code with Explanatory
Comments VI (1st Sess. 1939) [hereinafter “Proposed
Code”] (Letter from Sec. of State Cordell Hull, Att’y
Gen. Homer Cummings, and Sec. of Labor Frances
Perkins to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (June 1,
1938)).
The same belief informed the derivative
citizenship provision in the Nationality Act of 1940.
That Act was drafted not by Congress, but by an
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interdepartmental committee appointed by President
Franklin Roosevelt in 1933, charged with revising
the laws pertaining to citizenship, immigration, and
naturalization. Exec. Order No. 6115, Revision and
Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United
States (Apr. 25, 1933). That committee, drawn from
high-level administrators in the Departments of
Labor, State, and Justice, proposed a five-year, age-
calibrated child U.S. residence requirement that
applied if the child was born to a mixed-nationality
married couple. Proposed Code at 13-14; see also
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(g), 54 Stat.
1137, 1139. However, as explained by the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Labor, and the Attorney
General, the committee also was concerned that
“these residence requirements will impose great
hardship in some cases” where the “head of the
family” worked abroad for the American government
or an American enterprise of some sort. They
therefore proposed a special statutory exception to
the child residence requirement when the citizen
parent was the “head of the family”—a legal term of
art that, in this period, referred to the husband-
father.4 Proposed Code at VI.
The resulting statutory exception to the child
residence requirement, while facially gender-neutral,
relieved the children of many citizen fathers from
that onerous requirement, while severely
diminishing the likelihood that the children of citizen
mothers would benefit from it. The exception was
4. See, e.g., Cyclopedic Law Dictionary 522 (3d ed. 1940)
(defining “head of a family” in terms of the relationship between
“father and child” or “husband and wife”).
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triggered only when the citizen parent “at the time of
the child’s birth [was] residing abroad solely or
principally in the employment of the Government of
the United States or a bona fide American * * *
organization * * * for which he receives a substantial
compensation.” Nationality Act of 1940, § 201(g), 54
Stat. at 1139 (emphasis added). In the 1940s,
married women with children were seldom engaged
in such employment, especially not “at the time of
[her] child’s birth,” and hence the exception was of
virtually no use to citizen mothers.5
In the very design of the derivative citizenship
statute, as it applied to mixed-nationality married
couples, one can see the imprint of the male headship
principle and the corresponding belief that the wife
and children derived their political and cultural
character from the husband-father Although
married American mothers had acquired far greater
legal parental rights in domestic law by 1940, the
Nationality Act of 1940 did not treat them as equal
citizens—or equal parents—for purposes of parent-
child citizenship transmission.
Moreover, beliefs concerning the husband-father’s
disproportionate influence on his children’s national
character continued to inform the interpretation of
the derivative citizenship statute even after the
5. Women seeking employment abroad as Foreign Service
officers faced pervasive sex discrimination. See Homer L.
Calkin, Women in American Foreign Affairs 102-03, 110 (Aug.
1977). Moreover, in the mid-twentieth century, working women
were regularly lawfully dismissed during pregnancy, and few
had access to maternity leave or job security following the birth
of a child. See Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity:
Women, Men and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th-
Century America 210-11 (2001).
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Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the 1952
Act) secured greater formal equality for married
citizen mothers. Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163. In Rogers v. Bellei,
decided in 1971, this Court discussed the concern
that children who grow up in a mixed-nationality
family will develop “divided” loyalties. The Court
observed that such a concern was especially valid
“when it is the father who is the child’s alien parent
and the father chooses to have his family reside in
the country of his own nationality.” 401 U.S. 815,
832 (1971).
In sum, the historical sources show that beliefs
regarding men’s and women’s respective roles as
parents—especially the father’s role as “head of the
family”—shaped the development and interpretation
of the derivative citizenship law as it applied to the
marital family well into the late twentieth century.
Those beliefs continued to inform citizenship law
even after their influence had significantly
diminished in other domains of law, including the
law of parent and child. The constitutional infirmity
of these laws today is clear to modern jurists.
Reflecting on these and similar sex-based
immigration statutes in Kerry v. Din, Justice
Antonin Scalia observed that “[m]odern equal-
protection doctrine casts substantial doubt on the
permissibility of such asymmetric treatment of
women citizens” and that “modern moral judgment
rejects the premises of such a legal order.” 135 S. Ct.
2128, 2136 (2015).
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II. GENDER-BASED BELIEFS ANIMATED—
AND CONTINUE TO ANIMATE—THE
DISPARATE RIGHTS OF CITIZEN FATHERS AND
MOTHERS OF CHILDREN BORN OUTSIDE
MARRIAGE.
Outside the bonds of marriage, a mirror-opposite
pattern of sex-based regulation of derivative
citizenship prevailed. Starting in the early twentieth
century, federal officials readily recognized the
citizenship claims of the foreign-born children of
unmarried citizen mothers. By contrast, the
transmission of citizenship between citizen fathers
and their foreign-born nonmarital children was
severely restricted. This system, which remains in
place today, has constrained the ability of individual
mothers and fathers to parent their children free of
sex-based regulations that presume that they will
perform particular gender-specific roles. As
significant, it has created legally insurmountable
hurdles to the recognition of the father-child
relationship and, in the process, has divided fathers
from their children. In so doing, it has perpetuated
the ignominy and disadvantages of “illegitimacy” by
extending that status to the child’s citizenship. In
these ways, the gender-asymmetrical derivative
citizenship laws contravene this Court’s well-
established equal protection jurisprudence. See
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (“Stereotypes about women's
domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes
presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for
men.”); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 171 (1972) (worker’s compensation provision
that barred collection by illegitimate children is
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unconstitutional where father is unable to legally
acknowledge his child).
A. The Sex-Based Requirements in the
Derivative Citizenship Statute Are Premised
on and Perpetuate the Gender Stereotype
That the Mother Is the “Natural” Caregiver of
the Nonmarital Child.
Premised on the view that mothers are
responsible for the care of nonmarital children, the
federal government has been far more solicitous of
the citizenship claims of foreign-born nonmarital
children of citizen mothers than it has been of claims
of foreign-born nonmarital children of citizen fathers.
This practice reflected an important development in
the law governing the relationship of the mother and
her nonmarital child. While long considered “the son
of nobody” under the common law, the nonmarital
child was customarily in the care of the mother. 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries *458-59.
Gradually, the mother-child relationship was given
legal recognition by American jurists and legislators,
reflecting the customary understanding that the
mother was the child’s “natural” caregiver.
Grossberg, supra at 207-09.
Based on that understanding, as well as powerful
maternalist norms that shaped American law in the
early twentieth century, federal officials of that era
recognized the citizenship claims of foreign-born
nonmarital children of citizen mothers even before
Congress addressed the subject in legislation. See,
e.g., Proposed Code at 18 (noting that “[t]he
Department of State has, at least since 1912,
uniformly held that an illegitimate child born abroad
of an American mother acquires at birth the
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nationality of the mother * * *.”); see also Collins,
123 Yale L.J. 2200-01.
In the 1920s, this special recognition of the
foreign-born nonmarital children of American
mothers was memorialized in a cross-border
agreement between the Department of Labor’s
Bureau of Immigration and Canadian immigration
officials. In this agreement, officials of both
countries agreed to recognize the foreign-born
nonmarital child as a citizen of the mother’s country.
See id. at 2201-03. The Department of State followed
the same practice. Proposed Code at 18.
In numerous memoranda and letters explaining
the cross-border agreement, federal officials opined
that nonmarital children were in need of special
recognition under the derivative citizenship statute,
which at the time provided for citizenship
transmission only through the married father. See
Collins, 123 Yale L.J. at 2203. Because mothers
were the presumed caregivers of nonmarital
children, that patrilineal rule would leave the child
divided by citizenship law from his or her caregiver.
“[T]he only purpose [for the rule] is to provide
against separation of mothers and children,”
explained the Commissioner General of the Bureau
of Immigration in 1929. Letter from Harry E. Hull,
Comm’r Gen., U.S. Bureau of Immigr., to T.M. Ross,
Acting U.S. Comm’r of Immigr., Montreal, Can. (Nov.
8, 1929)6; see also Collins, 123 Yale L.J. at 2202-03
(describing similar memoranda).
6. Archival sources cited herein are located in the National
Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C.
Amici will provide copies to the Court upon request.
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In the late 1930s, as the interdepartmental
committee revised the entire corpus of American
nationality law, see supra at 13, it included a
provision that would codify the administrative
practice of recognizing the foreign-born nonmarital
children of American mothers as American citizens.
Cabinet-level officials endorsed this provision. For
example, in 1939, when the issue came to the
attention of Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, she
opined that “steps should be taken to avoid
subjecting these unfortunate individuals to
unnecessary hardships.” Letter from Frances
Perkins, Sec’y of Labor, to Cordell Hull, Sec’y of
State 3 (Mar. 15, 1939). Attorney General Frank
Murphy concurred, noting that “exclusion of [such]
children is not only harsh, but largely impracticable.”
Letter from Frank Murphy, Att’y Gen., to Cordell
Hull, Sec’y of State 2 (May 10, 1939).
When Congress enacted the Nationality Act of
1940, it adopted the language in the committee’s
Proposed Code concerning the citizenship status of
foreign-born children of American mothers. Section
205 of the Act provided that if the “mother had the
nationality of the United States at the time of the
child’s birth, and had previously resided in the
United States or one of its outlying possessions,” the
child “shall be held to have acquired at birth her
nationality status.” Nationality Act of 1940, § 205,
54 Stat. at 1139-40; see also Proposed Code at 18.
Thus, citizenship transmission between the citizen
mother and her nonmarital child was limited only by
a de minimis parental residence requirement—a
situation that continued under the 1952 Act (the
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version of the statute at issue in this case)7 and every
revision of the derivative citizenship statute since
then. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §
309, 66 Stat. at 238-39; Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655.8
In short, the historical sources make clear that
the federal government’s ready recognition of citizen
mothers as the source of citizenship for foreign-born
nonmarital children was largely driven by concern
that the citizenship of the nonmarital child should
align with that of his or her caregiver, and that the
“natural” caregiver was the mother. In so doing, it
has reinforced fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of men and women as parents, thus running
afoul of this Court’s well-established equal protection
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443
U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (internal quotations omitted)
(presumption that “the father has the primary
responsibility to provide a home” while “the mother
is the center of home and family life” is not a valid
basis for legislation).
7. Sections 301 and 309 of the 1952 Act were codified in the
1958 edition of the United States Code. See Pet. Br. at 3 n.1.
8. In 1952, Congress deleted a primary limitation on mother-
child citizenship transmission outside marriage—that the child
would take the citizenship of his or her American mother only
“in the absence of * * * legitimation” by the father. Nationality
Act of 1940, § 205, 54 Stat. at 1140; Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, § 309(c), 66 Stat. at 238-39. Congress
also lengthened the parental presence requirement applicable
to citizen mothers of foreign-born nonmarital children to one
year. Id. § 309(c), 66 Stat. at 238-39.
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B. The Sex-Based Requirements in the
Derivative Citizenship Statute Place Undue
Burdens on the Father-Child Relationship and
Reinforce Gender-Based Parental Roles.
Premised on the outdated view that unwed
fathers have attenuated relationships with their
nonmarital children, American citizenship law has
consistently burdened father-child citizenship
transmission outside marriage. In this regard, the
derivative citizenship statutes have not only
reinforced gender-based understandings of parental
roles and responsibilities, they have also thwarted—
and continue to thwart—the development of father-
child relationships outside marriage in contravention
of this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979)
(invalidating a state adoption law that discriminated
against unwed fathers, thus classifying them “as
being invariably less qualified and entitled than
mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as to the
fate of their children”).
1. Historically, the Derivative Citizenship
Statute Has Been Narrowly Interpreted to
Restrict Citizenship Transmission Between
Citizen Fathers and Their Foreign-Born
Nonmarital Children.
The 1952 Act’s ten-year parental presence
requirement—which applies to American fathers of
nonmarital children, but not to American mothers of
nonmarital children—is just one of many legal
barriers that restrict citizenship transmission
between American fathers and their foreign-born
nonmarital children. In the present case, the
government urges that this ten-year presence
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requirement is “gender neutral” in its purpose and
function in that it simply incorporated the legal
“reality” of the father-child relationship at the time.
Pet. Br. at 5, 9, 11, 40. The historical evidence shows
instead that it is one of several statutory provisions
that reflected and reinforced federal administrators’
and legislators’ inability to conceive of fathers as
caregivers responsible for the well-being of their
nonmarital children.
Such gender-based biases concerning parental
roles outside marriage were pervasive in the
nineteenth century and resulted in the restriction of
father-child citizenship transmission outside
marriage, even before Congress explicitly addressed
the citizenship status of foreign-born nonmarital
children in 1940. From 1790 to 1940, the derivative
citizenship statutes were silent as to the marital
status of the citizen parent. Act 1855, § 1; Act of
Apr. 14, 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. at 155; Act of Jan. 29,
1795, § 3, 1 Stat. at 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat.
at 103-104. Nevertheless, these statutes were
interpreted to allow transmission of citizenship to
the marital children of citizen fathers, but not to
their nonmarital children.
The lead nineteenth-century case on this subject,
Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864), was routinely
cited as the authoritative interpretation of the pre-
1940 derivative citizenship statute by jurists,
administrators, and commentators through the
1930s. See Collins, 123 Yale L.J. at 2153-54 nn.
67-68. In Guyer, the father had recognized his two
sons by giving them his name and naming them in
his will. See Guyer, 22 Md. at 246. Yet the Guyer
court refused to recognize the sons as citizens under
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the governing citizenship statute, which provided
that “the children of persons who now are or have
been citizens of the United States” born in another
country, “shall * * * be considered as citizens of the
United States,” id. at 244 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court concluded that the sons were
“illegitimate” and thus not contemplated by the
statute. Id. at 249.
By 1920, judges and administrators gradually
recognized the citizenship claims of at least some
foreign-born nonmarital children who had been
“legitimated” by the citizen father. See 32 Op. Att’y
Gen. 162, 164-65 (1920). But this administrative
legitimation exception was narrow and uncertain.
See, e.g., Mason ex rel Chen Suey v. Tillinghast, 26
F.2d 588, 589 (1st Cir. 1928) (affirming rejection of
evidence of legitimation for purposes of determining
citizenship of foreign-born nonmarital child of
American father of Chinese descent); see also Edwin
M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens
Abroad 612-13 (1915) (questioning the propriety of
legitimation as a basis for father-child citizenship
transmission and observing that “illegitimate half-
castes born in semi-barbarous countries of American
fathers and native women are not American
citizens”); Collins, 123 Yale L.J. at 2174-80.
The federal government’s resistance to
recognizing the foreign-born nonmarital children of
American fathers as citizens continued into the early
1930s. Legislators considered bills that would have
secured parental gender equality with respect to the
transmission of citizenship from citizen parents to
their foreign-born children, regardless of the parents’
sex or marital status.
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Any child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, born out of the limits and
jurisdiction of the United States, whose
father or mother may be at the time of
the birth of such child a citizen of the
United States, is declared to be a citizen
of the United States; but the right of
citizenship shall not descend to any
child whose father or mother had never
resided in the United States previous to
the birth of such child.
H.R. 14,684, 71st Cong. § 3 (3d Sess.1930) (emphasis
added); see also H.R. 5489, 72d Cong. (1st
Sess.1931).
Supporters of such bills urged that equal
treatment of the citizen mothers and fathers of
foreign-born nonmarital children was warranted
pursuant to the gender-equality principles that
informed the 1922 Cable Act. See supra at 9;
Hearings on H.R. 5489, 72d Cong. 3-5 (statement of
Burnita Shelton Matthews); id. at 17-19 (statement
of Laura M. Berrien). Nevertheless, resistance to
full gender equality in matters relating to derivative
citizenship was fatal to the inclusion of “illegitimate”
in the bill. See Bredbenner, supra, at 230-31. And
in 1934, when Congress passed a statute enabling
married citizen mothers to transmit citizenship to
their foreign-born children, the final version of the
bill said nothing about parental marital status, but
was understood to apply to the foreign-born children
of married citizen parents only. 78 Cong. Rec. 7357
(Apr. 25, 1934) (statement of Rep. Jenkins) (“[This
bill] applies to the children of wives and the children
of husbands.”); 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 290, 291 (1939)
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(recognizing “that the applicable statutory provisions
apply only to legitimate children”).
Six years later, Congress finally addressed the
citizenship status of foreign-born nonmarital
children of American citizens, making explicit in law
what had been understood for many decades:
American citizenship law would distance fathers
from their nonmarital children. Nationality Act of
1940, §§ 201(g), 205, 54 Stat. at 1139-40.
Written by the administrators appointed by
President Roosevelt to the interdepartmental
committee, supra at 13, the Nationality Act of 1940
required that the father prove paternity by
“legitimation” or by “adjudication by a competent
court,” id. § 205, and contained a five-year, age-
calibrated U.S. residence requirement for the child,
as had the 1934 Act, id. § 201(g). In addition, the
1940 Act extended the law’s sex-based differential
treatment of citizen parents of nonmarital children
by imposing new limitations on the transmission of
citizenship from citizen fathers to foreign-born
nonmarital children, including: (1) a ten-year, age-
calibrated U.S. presence requirement for the father,
id. § 201(g), and (2) a requirement that the child
must be in the father’s custody at the time of
legitimation, id. § 102(h). None of these
requirements applied to unmarried American
mothers or their foreign-born children. Id. § 205.
In 1952, Congress essentially recodified these
provisions, making one significant change with
respect to fathers of nonmarital children: it
eliminated the possibility that paternity could be
established by a “competent court.” Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, § 309, 66 Stat. at 238.
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2. The 1952 Act Places Undue Burdens on the
Father-Child Relationship and Is Premised
on Outdated Gender-Based Beliefs About
Parental Roles.
Careful examination of the text and
implementation of the 1952 Act demonstrates that
the gender-asymmetrical requirements in the
derivative citizenship provision both: (1) place
substantial burdens on the American father’s ability
to establish a relationship—legal and social—with
his nonmarital child, and (2) reinforce the gender-
based stereotype that fathers are not proper or
adequate caregivers, especially without a wife-
mother’s presence. In both respects, these provisions
run afoul of well-established equal protection
principles.
First, the “legitimation” requirement in the 1952
Act has left many fathers divided by citizenship from
children with whom they had a legally recognized
relationship under the domestic law of the relevant
jurisdiction,9 and for whom the fathers were willing
and able to provide care.
This is because both today and in the past,
federal officials interpreting the term “legitimation”
in the 1952 Act have refused to recognize children as
citizens unless the process of paternal legitimation
used by the American father gave the child exactly
the same rights and entitlements as a marital child.
9. Section 101(c) of the 1952 Act specifies that the child has
to have been “legitimated” under “the law of the child’s
residence or domicile, or * * * the law of the father’s residence
or domicile,” whether U.S. or foreign. Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(c), 66 Stat. at 171.
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See In re Reyes, 17 I&N Dec. 512, 514-15 (BIA 1980)
(noting that the BIA has long interpreted
“legitimation” to require that the nonmarital child
had “attained the full legal status of legitimate
children”). In the mid-twentieth century, as today,
in many jurisdictions the nonmarital child could
achieve full equality with the marital child only if
the father married the mother. See id. at 514
(“legitimation laws have commonly required the
subsequent marriage of a child’s natural parents”);
see also Retuya v. Mueller, 412 F. App’x 185, 188-189
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that paternity established
by formal acknowledgment allowed under Florida
law did not satisfy the 1952 Act’s “legitimation”
requirement)10; Collins, 123 Yale L.J. at 2198 n.256
(providing examples of federal officials’ refusal to
recognize paternal acknowledgment as “legitimation”
absent marriage of the parents). Thus, the 1952 Act
required fathers to do far more than prove paternity
and recognize the child in writing during the child’s
minority, as is permitted under the 1986 version of
the derivative citizenship statute that this Court
described as imposing only “minimal” requirements
on the father in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70
(2001).
Moreover, because the legitimation requirement
has been held to require much more than formal
paternal acknowledgment, it is often impossible—
legally or otherwise—for a father to secure
10. For additional examples of Board of Immigration
Appeals opinions rejecting various acts of paternal
acknowledgment recognized under the laws of the relevant
jurisdictions as insufficient to qualify as “legitimation,” see
Matter of D—, 7 I&N Dec. 438 (BIA 1957) (collecting cases).
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citizenship for his foreign-born nonmarital child. For
example, if full “legitimation” under the relevant
jurisdiction’s domestic laws requires marriage of the
parents—as was, and still often is, the case—then
the American father may be completely precluded
from satisfying the derivative citizenship statute’s
legitimation requirement. Marriage to a child’s
mother may be legally or physically impossible,
either because the child’s mother refuses, is married
to another, or has died, or because the marriage was
prohibited, as was the case of many interracial
marriages prior to this Court’s opinion in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See Collins, 123 Yale
L.J. at 2209-11; see also Rose Cuison Villazor, The
Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal Government’s
Racial Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1361, 1429, 1434 n.451 (2011). Indeed, in the past,
when a father could not marry his foreign-born
child’s mother because a state ban on interracial
marriage made it impossible for him to fully
legitimate his child, the legitimation requirement in
the derivative citizenship statute operated as a sex-
and race-based barrier to the transmission of
American citizenship.
The government contends that the derivative
citizenship statute’s gender-differentiated treatment
of mothers and fathers outside marriage reflected the
legal “reality” that domestic family law did not
recognize the unwed father as a legal parent at birth.
Pet. Br. at 5, 10, 11, 40. Thus, the government
reasons, the derivative citizenship statute
distinguished between two “gender-neutral”
categories of parents: those who were “legally
recognized” under the domestic law of the relevant
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jurisdiction and those who were not. Pet. Br. at 9,
11, 28, 40.
The historical sources show, however, that the
laws governing the parent-child relationship outside
marriage in the 1940s and 1950s were not “gender
neutral.” Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, this Court
found that many of those laws were informed by
impermissible gender-based beliefs about men as
fathers, thus violating the equal protection and due
process rights of unmarried fathers and their
children. See, e.g., Trimble 430 U.S. at 769; Stanley,
405 U.S. at 651; Weber, 406 U.S. 171; Caban, 441
U.S. at 389.
Moreover, even though the laws in the early
twentieth century limited recognition of the father’s
relationship with his nonmarital child in ways that
are no longer tolerated, the legal principles that
governed that relationship were far more varied than
the government now suggests. By 1952, many
jurisdictions allowed fathers to establish paternity
through formal or informal acknowledgment, which
often conferred inheritance rights on the nonmarital
child.11 Significantly, some jurisdictions granted
inheritance rights even absent voluntary
legitimation or recognition by the father.12 These
inheritance laws augmented the ubiquitous and
11. E.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 14-104 (1932); Okla. Stat. Ann.
§ 1619 (Harlowe 1931); Wash. Rev. Code § 11.04.080 (1951);
Iowa Code Ann. § 636.46 (1946); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-501, 506
(1949); Ala. Code tit. 27, § 11 (1940). See also 7 Am. Jur.
Bastards §§ 54-55, 57, 59 (1937).
12. E.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 636.46; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-501,
506. See also 7 Am. Jur., supra, n.11 § 53.
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traditional paternity statutes that enabled the
nonmarital child, or someone acting on his or her
behalf, to sue the father for financial support.13
Taken together, these statutes signaled important
changes in the laws governing the father-child
relationship as they substantially abandoned the
common law principle that the nomarital child “was
the son of nobody.” 1 Blackstone, Commentaries
*459. Despite significant changes in the laws
governing the father-child relationship outside of
marriage, however, federal officials enforcing the
1952 Act refused to recognize that relationship
unless the father fully “legitimated” the child. Cf.
Kerry Abrams & Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s
Family Values, 100 Va. L. Rev. 629, 698 (2014) (“The
same person who might likely be declared a legal
parent under state family law will often find himself
to be a legal stranger to his child for citizenship law
purposes.”).
In short, Congress did not simply incorporate
domestic laws governing what counted as a legal
parent-child relationship when it drafted the 1952
Act’s derivative citizenship provision. Rather, by
requiring full “legitimation” by the citizen father of
his nonmarital child, the Act, as interpreted by
federal officials, imposed an often insurmountable,
undeniably sex-discriminatory burden on the
transmission of citizenship between fathers and their
nonmarital children. In so doing, it has thwarted
fathers’ efforts to establish legal and social
13. See Ernst Freund, Illegitimacy Laws of the United
States and Certain Foreign Countries 27-30, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Child. Bureau (1919). See also 7 Am. Jur., supra, n.11
§ 69.
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relationships with their children. See Trimble, 430
U.S. at 769 (state probate law that barred
“illegitimate” children from inheriting from their
fathers and allowed “legitimation” only by
subsequent marriage of the parents violates equal
protection).
Second, taken together, the numerous statutory
burdens placed on American fathers attempting to
secure citizenship for their nonmarital children—
burdens not placed on American mothers—reflect the
gender-based belief that mothers are the natural
caregivers for nonmarital children.
This point is amply demonstrated by the joint
operation of the legitimation requirement and the
ten-year parental presence requirement in the 1952
Act. Under the terms of that statute, once the father
“legitimated” the child, which often required
marriage to the mother, the statute required him to
satisfy the ten-year presence requirement.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 309(b),
66 Stat. at 238. No statute or policy has ever
required American mothers to marry the nonmarital
child’s foreign father or go through any legal
procedure in order to transmit citizenship to that
child. Indeed, if the mother did marry the child’s
non-citizen father, under the 1952 Act the mother
was exempt from satisfying the significantly longer
parental presence requirement that applied to
fathers of nonmarital children.14 Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, § 309(c), 66 Stat. at 238-239.
14. The government acknowledges this fact, Pet. Br. at 6, 39
n.8, but appears to assert a contrary position elsewhere its
brief, id. at 10.
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Operating together, the sex-based legitimation
requirement and the sex-based ten-year presence
requirement reveal the outdated presumption that
courses through the 1952 Act: mothers invariably
raise nonmarital children and fathers do not. Early-
and mid-twentieth century legislators and
administrators who crafted this derivative
citizenship law felt an imperative to relax the
generally-applicable requirements for citizenship
transmission for the nonmarital children of
American mothers out of concern that children would
be separated from their caregivers. See supra at 18-
19. Yet, they declined to give such consideration to
the nonmarital children of American fathers.
This occurred not because Congress was beholden
to a particular immutable, legal conception of the
“legally recognized” father-child relationship outside
of marriage. Indeed, as has been shown, federal
officials charged with implementing the derivative
citizenship law routinely used a far more restrictive
understanding of the legal father-child relationship
than was provided in the domestic laws of state and
foreign jurisdictions. Rather, consistent with its
long-standing practice, Congress codified and
maintained anachronistic gender-based norms
concerning the father-child relationship in the laws
governing citizenship transmission to nonmarital
foreign-born children.
It continues to do so today, despite developments
in this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, which
for several decades has recognized that “maternal
and paternal roles are not invariably different in
importance,” Caban, 441 U.S. at 389, and that the
belief that “caring for family members is women’s
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work” is no longer an acceptable legislative purpose,
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731.
III. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT CONGRESS
ENACTED THE GENDER ASYMMETRICAL
CITIZENSHIP STATUTE IN AN EFFORT TO
PROTECT CERTAIN CHILDREN AGAINST
STATELESSNESS.
The government contends that Congress eased
the conditions under which mothers transmit
citizenship to their nonmarital foreign-born
children—and, in particular, exemption from the ten-
year parental presence requirement—out of concern
for the risk of statelessness for these children. Pet.
Br. at 33-39. This assertion ignores the best
evidence of why the gender-asymmetrical presence
requirement, which was so generous toward
unmarried mothers and their foreign-born children,
was first introduced into the derivative citizenship
statute in 1940.
As already noted, the primary origin of the 1940
Act’s recognition of foreign-born nonmarital children
of American mothers as citizens was the policies of
the Department of Labor and the Department of
State, including a cross-border agreement with
Canada in which officials of both countries agreed to
recognize the foreign-born nonmarital child of an
American or Canadian mother as a citizen of the
mother’s country. See supra at 18. In the
memoranda and letters by administrators discussing
and memorializing that agreement, there is virtually
no mention of statelessness. See Collins, 123 Yale
L.J. at 2204-05 n.283. Rather, the documents reflect
early twentieth-century officials’ understanding that
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mothers are the presumed and natural caregivers of
their nonmarital children, and their concern that the
separation of mothers from their nonmarital children
was both harsh and impractical. Id. at 2200-03. The
same is true of memoranda and letters by cabinet-
level officials and members of the interdepartmental
committee concerning why special solicitude should
be shown to foreign-born nonmarital children of
American mothers: the need to keep the child with
his or her “natural” caregiver. See supra at 18-19.
In addition, even assuming that early twentieth-
century administrators and legislators were
concerned that the foreign-born nonmarital children
of American mothers were at risk of statelessness,
any such concern appears to reflect the same gender
bias that long structured intergenerational
citizenship transmission in American law. In the
1930s, experts in citizenship law knew that the
foreign-born nonmarital children of American
mothers and fathers were at risk of statelessness. In
the most important early twentieth-century
American treatise on the subject, Statelessness:
With Special Reference to the United States (1934),
Professor Catharine Seckler-Hudson described the
risk of statelessness facing all nonmarital children.
See id. at 224-25. She was skeptical that, in 1934,
the United States would recognize foreign-born
nonmarital children of citizen fathers as American
citizens, whether legitimated or not. Id. at 224, 220-
221 (citing Guyer, 22 Md. 239). Accordingly, she
observed that when these children were born in jus
sanguinis countries in which they did not acquire
nationality through the mother, they “had no
effective citizenship.” Id. at 221.
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Also—and of particular significance here—
Seckler-Hudson noted the risk of statelessness for
nonmarital children born to American fathers who
did not satisfy the parental presence requirement in
the derivative citizenship statute, which in 1934 was
de minimis. Id. at 220, 225.
Thus, the risk of statelessness for foreign-born
nonmarital children of citizen fathers was well
known when members of the interdepartmental
committee and legislators were considering the
question of how to regulate citizenship transmission
to nonmarital foreign-born children in the 1930s.
Indeed, Congress was presented with legislative
proposals that would have helped remedy the various
risks of statelessness confronting foreign-born
children of American citizens, and would have done
so in a gender-neutral manner, but chose not to
enact them. These were bills introduced in the early
1930s that provided that “[a]ny child, legitimate or
illegitimate” born abroad of a citizen mother or
father was an American citizen, subject to a modest
(and gender-neutral) parental presence requirement.
E.g., H.R. 14,684, 71st Cong. § 3 (3d Sess.1930);
supra at 24. Congress rejected those bills, despite the
fact that Seckler-Hudson endorsed this legislation in
her book. Seckler-Hudson, supra, at 222. Instead,
Congress enacted a statute that imposed a ten-year
presence requirement on American fathers who
“legitimated” their foreign-born children, thus
exposing them to a substantial risk of statelessness if
they did not acquire the citizenship of their mothers,
or were divested of that citizenship upon legitimation
by their American fathers.
36
In sum, the historical sources provide scant
evidence that federal officials in the 1930s and
1940s—who were responsible for the initial
codification of the sex-based parental presence
requirement—acted out of a particular concern about
statelessness for American mothers’ foreign-born
nonmarital children. Instead, these sources support
the conclusion that the sex-based distinctions in the
derivative citizenship statute reflect then-prevailing
views about mothers’ and fathers’ respective
parental roles and responsibilities outside of
marriage.
Laws premised on historically rooted gender-
based assumptions concerning how men and women
behave as parents—and how they should behave—
have no place in the regulation of American
citizenship. It is no longer acceptable for the federal
government to maintain citizenship laws that
perpetuate and reinforce gender-differentiated
family roles by limiting individuals’ rights as parents
through sex-based classifications, see Hibbs, 538
U.S. at 736, especially when these laws have also
been used for other constitutionally suspect ends.
The historical record demonstrates, however, that
the federal government has done just that in its
regulation of derivative citizenship of foreign-born
nonmarital children of American citizen parents.
Similarly, laws that unduly burden the
recognition of the father-child relationship also run
afoul of modern equal protection and due process
principles. See, e.g., Trimble, 430 U.S. at 769;
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651; Weber, 406 U.S. 171;
Caban, 441 U.S. at 389. Yet the derivative
citizenship statutes have created legal barriers to
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father-child citizenship transmission that thwart the
development of the father-child bond—even where
the father has legally acknowledged and raised the
child—thus separating fathers from children. These
barriers are unbefitting a constitutional system that
respects the dignity of the father-child relationship
and that recognizes that “a father, no less than a
mother, has a constitutionally protected right to the
‘companionship, care, custody and management’ of
‘the children he has sired and raised.’” Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1975) (quoting
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
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